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UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN COMPETITIVE RETAIL




During most of the twentieth century, the privately-owned electric utility
was regulated as a natural monopoly. Under the natural monopoly paradigm, a
vertically-integrated electric utility provides generation, transmission, and distri-
bution services under the rubric of a single firm serving a geographic service ter-
ritory. While it is allowed to operate as a monopolist, this firm also has certain
responsibilities. It submits to price regulation, assumes obligations to extend
service to all customers within its geographic service territory, and agrees to
continue providing service, once service has commenced.'
With the advent of competitive restructuring, conventional wisdom assumes
that markets will largely displace price regulation, but little discussion focuses
on the implications of deregulation for service obligations in the electric power
industry. Today, electric utilities' extraordinary service obligations - often col-
lectively referred to as the "duty to serve" - face their largest challenge ever.
The potential conflict between universal service and retail competition in elec-
tricity bears analogy to a tension in other industries, such as natural gas and tele-
communications. In the natural gas industry, deregulated by the Federal Energy
Regulatory Commission (FERC) in 1992,2 local gas distribution companies are
already beginning to offer many customers retail choice in many states.3 Yet, in
New York, the natural gas industry's recent introduction of retail competition
has already been alleged to adversely affect the quality of gas service essential to
many New Yorkers for heating, leading to a lawsuit against the state by con-
sumer advocates. a Although competitive reforms to the electricity industry lag
* Jim Rossi is the Patricia A. Dore Associate Professor at Florida State University College of Law.
1. CHARLES M. HAAR & DANIEL WM. FESSLER, THE WRONG SIDE OF THE TRACKS: A
REVOLUTIONARY REDISCOVERY OF THE COMMON LAW TRADITION OF FAIRNESS IN THE STRUGGLE AGAINST
INEQUALITY 15 (1986) ("Over the centuries, the common law doctrine of equal services and the duty to serve
surfaced and resurfaced as a potent and dynamic means to address changing - and often the grimmest imagin-
able - social and economic traditions."). For an engaging argument that the common law duty to serve extends
beyond common carriers and innkeepers to include private retail establishments, see Joseph William Singer, No
Right to Exclude: Public Accommodations and Private Property, 90 Nw. U. L. REV. 1283 (1996). See also
David S. Bogen, The Innkeepers's Tale: The Legal Development of a Public Calling, 1996 UTAH L. REV. 51
(1996).
2. Pipeline Service Obligations and Revisions to Regulations Governing Self-Implementing Transpor-
tation and Regulation of Natural Gas Pipelines After Partial Wellhead Decontrol, 57 Fed. Reg. 13,267 (1992),
order on rehg, 57 Fed. Reg. 36,128 (1992), order on reh'g, 57 Fed. Reg. 57,911 (1992), reversed and re-
manded, United Distribution Cos. v. FERC, 88 F.3d 1105 (D.C. Cir. 1996), order on remand, 78 F.E.R.C.
61,186 (1997). Order No. 636 is codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 284 (1997).
3. George R. Hall & Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Retail Gas Reform: Learning from the Georgia Model, 8
PUB. UTIL. FORT., Apr. 15, 1997, at 22, 24 (summarizing state developments and predicting that more than 12
million homes, comprising greater than 20% of U.S. residential customers, will have a choice of gas suppliers
by the year 2000); see also KEVIN COSTELLO & J. RODNEY LEMON, UNBUNDLING THE RETAIL NATURAL GAS
MARKET: CURRENT ACTIVITIES AND GUIDANCE FOR SERVING RESIDENTIAL AND SMALL CONSUMERS (1996).
4. Gerald A. Norlander Retail Choice: A Race to the Bottom, 136 No. I PUB. UTIL. FORT., Jan. 1,
1998, at 8 (letter to the editor). The case, brought by consumer taxpayers and a consumer advocate nonprofit
group alleging illegal expenditure of public funds under the state finance law, was dismissed for lack of stand-
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behind the natural gas and telecommunication industries, 5 as electricity is de-
regulated, particularly at the retail level, similar problems can be expected to
arise.
Can vigorous retail competition of the type public utility deregulation envi-
sions coexist with extraordinary obligations to serve customers? If so, at what
cost? Who will bear these costs? These questions are central to an emerging
law and economic analysis known as the "jurisprudence of networks,, 6 which is
of paramount importance as regulators and courts implement competition in tra-
ditional public utility industries, including electricity, where the natural monop-
oly model is being abandoned or reformed.
After summarizing how the duty to serve was implemented in the electricity
industry under natural monopoly regulation, this article addresses whether tradi-
tional service obligations can coexist with retail competition. A rationale often
given for universal service obligations in the telecommunications industry is that
universal service, by promoting interconnectivity, enhances network system
benefits for all customers. While the network economies argument may have
worked to sustain universal service in the face of telecommunications deregula-
tion, it is tenuous when applied to the natural gas and electricity industries.
Many reformers look askance at the duty to serve in competitive retail utility
service markets,7 often pointing to conflict between retail competition in elec-
tricity and the duty to serve.8  This article argues, however, that application of
ing. See Public Util. Law Project of N.Y., Inc. v. New York State Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 681 N.Y.S.2d 396
(A.D.3d 1998).
5. The development of competition in electricity is hardly a United States-specific phenomenon. Many
other countries have also deregulated the electricity industry. Electricity competition is also the subject of a
recent directive of the European Communities. Directive 96/92 Concerning Common Rules for the Internal
Market in Electricity, 1996 O.J. (L27) 27 (requiring Member States to take measures to open up markets for
electricity). See also A.M. Klom, Effects of Deregulation Policies on Electricity Competition in the EU, 15 J.
ENERGY& NAT. RESOURCES L. I (1997).
6. J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY
CONTRACT: THE TRANSFORMATION OF NETWORK INDUSTRIES IN THE UNITED STATES (1997) (arguing that,
because of the regulatory compact between industry and the state, deregulation could violate the takings or
contract clause of the U.S. Constitution).
7. For early efforts to address the related tension between wholesale competition and utility service
obligations, see Joe D. Pace, Wheeling and the Obligation to Serve, 8 ENERGY L.J. 265 (1987) (warning of po-
tential conflict, but offering no specific solution); J.A. Bouknight & David B. Raskin, Planning for Wholesale
Customer Loads in a Competitive Environment: The Obligation to Provide Wholesale Service Under the Fed-
eral Power Act, 8 ENERGY L.J. 237 (1987) (noting potential conflict between the FERC's legal obligations and
wholesale competition); Floyd Norton & Mark Spivak, The Wholesale Service Obligation of Electric Utilities,
6 ENERGY L.J. 179 (1985) (speculating about implications of competition for the obligation to provide whole-
sale electric service). This article provides a more complete approach than these earlier efforts, partly because
most of the wholesale restructuring that previously was the subject of speculation has materialized, so key facts
about a restructured industry are available for analysis. In addition, this article focuses on impacts for end use,
retail customers and applies generally to restructured public utility industries, not just electricity.
8. There is little, if any, disagreement that retail wheeling is incompatible with an obligation to serve.
A utility cannot be obligated to meet the energy needs of potential customers within its service terri-
tory without some guarantee of recovering the costs associated with that obligation. To do otherwise
would clearly result in economic inefficiencies. It would also lead to further inequities, since the
costs and risks of meeting a standing obligation would be bome either by the utility's remaining
customers or its stockholders.
Jonathon A. Lesser & Malcolm D. Ainspan, Retail Wheeling: Deja Vu All Over Again?, ELECTRICITY J., Apr.
[Vol. 21:27
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extraordinary service obligations to distribution companies in a competitive re-
tail framework can coexist with improved efficiency in retail power markets, al-
though the abandonment of the natural monopoly framework challenges regula-
tors to articulate new rationale for service obligations and to devise new ways of
paying for them.
II. THE PUBLIC UTILITY'S "DUTY TO SERVE" IN THE ERA OF NATURAL
MONOPOLY REGULATION
Twentieth century U.S. regulators built on an ancient common law duty that
applied to public utilities such as ferries, flour mills, and railroads, imposing on
electric utilities a "duty to serve," an obligation to provide extraordinary levels
of service to customers, especially small residential customers. As applied today
in most states, the public utility duty to serve entails several obligations, includ-
ing: the duty to interconnect and extend service if requested; the duty to provide
continuing reliable service; the duty to provide advanced notice of service dis-
connection; and the duty to continue service even though a customer cannot
make full payment. Unlike other obligations that apply to private firms, includ-
ing those such as inns and restaurants representing or holding themselves out as
serving the public,9 in the public utility context the duty to serve requires service
where it is not ordinarily considered profitable. The link between the public
utility concept and the duty to serve has survived many different regulatory eras
and institutional arrangements, gamering a variety of intellectual explanations.'0
There are strong fairness or distributional arguments supporting a duty to serve;
many of these overlap with the goals of the civil rights movement, without
which many customers would not have had equal access to quality utility serv-
ice. However, in the modem era of public utility regulation-beginning with the
Gilded Age and lasting through the present-the economics of natural monopoly
regulation provide the predominant intellectual framework supporting extraordi-
nary obligations for providers of utility services.
1994, at 34, 40-41.
9. Of course, civil rights laws may preclude service exclusion for some groups of individuals, see
Singer, supra note 1, but their scope is limited. Also, to the extent a public utility is a state actor (e.g., a mu-
nicipal utility), the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution may impose some limi-
tation on service exclusion. Apart from these exceptions, under antitrust laws, ordinary private businesses may
unilaterally refuse to deal with particular customers and set the terms and conditions under which they contract.
United States v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919) (noting that a firm may unilaterally refuse to deal
with a customer so long as that refusal does not intend to create or maintain a monopoly). The duty to serve,
however, imposes significantly more rigorous dealing and service terms and conditions on utilities than other
private actors.
10. See, e.g., Gustavus H. Robinson, The Public Utility Concept in American Law, 41 HARV. L. REV.
277 (1928) (tracing the evolution of the concept and defining it with respect to the provision of necessities);
Norman F. Artebum, The Origin and First Test of Public Callings, 75 U. PA. L. REV. 411 (1927) (discussing
the origins of the public utility); Charles K. Burdick, The Origin of the Peculiar Duties of Public Service Com-
panies, II COLUM. L. REV. 514 (1911) (tracing doctrine and history); Bruce Wyman, The Law of the Public
Callings as a Solution of the Trust Problem, 17 HARV. L. REV. 156, 161 (1903) (suggesting that "virtual mo-
nopoly" is the distinguishing feature of public utilities).
20001
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A. The Law and Economics of Horizontal and Vertical Integration
Natural monopoly regulation is often understood through the lens of the
"regulatory compact," a fictional contract between the utility and the state. Un-
der this compact, the utility consents to certain obligations, such as the duty to
serve, in return for its geographic franchise and expected recovery of its costs of
service through regulated rates. The relationship between a utility and the gov-
ernment, after all, is perhaps best understood within a long-term contract frame-
work, given the large amounts of capital required for network infrastructure and
the complexity of the underlying environment, leading to poor specification of
contractual terms." Some go so far as to suggest that this contract, though fic-
tional, must be honored by the state as any other legal contract,1 2 but the regula-
tory compact rationale is perhaps best understood as one account of the historical
development of utility regulation.'
3
In his famous article The Nature of the Firm, Ronald Coase observed that
all transactions in an economy are not necessarily most efficiently realized
through explicit exchange in the market.14 Oliver Williamson has generalized
Coase's observation to present a framework for analyzing the costs of market
contracting and the optimal degree of vertical and horizontal integration. Wil-
liamson observed that the costs of market contracting vary with uncertainty, the
frequency of transactions, asset specificity (the extent to which durable assets are
tailored to specific transactions), and problems caused by opportunism. Trans-
actions exhibiting these characteristics require complex contracts and tend to fa-
vor integration within organizations. As the need for contractual complexity
rises, so does the cost of bilateral contracting, making internal control more at-
tractive. 15
The Williamsonian framework provides a powerful explanation for the high
degrees of horizontal and vertical integration in the twentieth-century electric
utility industry, central to the traditional framework of natural monopoly regula-
tion. For example, the modern, investor-owned electric utility was conceived in
the nineteenth century in Chicago, by Samuel Insull, an associate of Thomas
11. Oliver E. Williamson, Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations, 22
J.L. & ECON. 233 (1979); Victor Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL. J. ECON. 444
(1976)].
12. See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 6. For criticism of this position, see Jim Rossi, Book Re-
view - The Irony of Deregulatory Takings. 77 TEX. L. REV. 297 (1998).
13. For example, George Priest describes utility regulation as evolving not from regulatory capture, but
from a pragmatic negotiation between utilities and local governments that gave utilities the power of eminent
domain. See generally George L. Priest, The Origins of Utility Regulation and the "Theories of Regulation"
Debate, 36 J. L. & ECON. 289, 303 (1992).
14. There is, in principle, no need for the market to organize around firms. Instead, market actors could
organize through arms-length transactions with the guidance of price mechanisms. A firm simply bypasses (or
internalizes) the system of market prices and coordinates production without the use of explicit prices. See
Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm. 4 ECONOMICA 386 (1937). Essentially, Coase was taking exception to
the then-dominant understanding that the "natural" evolution of the firm was defined by technology and its
costs and could be taken as given.
15. Williamson, supra note II; see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE
65-78, 103-05 (1996).
[Vol. 21:27
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Edison. 16 By this time, John Stuart Mill had recognized how natural monopolies
avoid waste," and economists such as Richard T. Ely and Henry Carter Adams
had written that monopolies result from economies of scale achieved by techno-
logical innovation.'8 The avoidance of economic waste and the achievement of
economies of scale through new technology were central to the origin of Insull's
monopoly. Initially, large Chicago electricity users, such as apartment buildings,
hotels, fancy shops, and department stores, generated power locally. Eventually,
Chicago Edison (Commonwealth Edison's predecessor), competing for in-
creased service territory, realized that ownership of multiple generators within
the same horizontally-integrated firm structure allowed significant coordination
of economies. With technological innovations, the central station became a fea-
sible technology for integrating adjacent electricity transmission systems.' 9
Hence, Insull was able to consolidate horizontally a geographic service territory
for a single utility, Chicago Edison; the utility was required to provide service
and, in return, the utility was given an exclusive franchise, precluding others
from providing service within its franchise area.
In addition, vertical integration of generation, transmission, and distribution
functions within the same firm allowed significant operational economies.20 In
the electricity industry, significant operational efficiencies have been realized by
the consolidation of generation and transmission within a single monopoly-
franchised firm. The economic arguments for vertical integration are bolstered
by electricity's technical characteristics, including the physics of transmission;
the high costs of storage; and the high degree of coordination necessary to sus-
16. The historian Harold Platt provides an intriguing historical account. HAROLD L. PLATT, THE
ELECTRIC CITY: ENERGY AND THE GROWTH OF THE CHICAGO AREA, 1880-1930 59-92 (1991). See also JAMES
A. THROGMORTON, PLANNING AS PERSUASIVE STORYTELLING: THE RHETORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF
CHICAGO'S ELECTRIC FUTURE (1996).
17. Mill argued that it would be uneconomical and duplicatively wasteful for cities to be connected to
parallel railroad tracks, or for a city to be served by more than a single postal service. JOHN STUART MILL,
PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (1848) (arguing that the London gas light industry would perform more
efficiently if it were a regulated monopoly rather than a competitive industry); see also E. Benjamin Andrew,
The Economic Law of Monopoly, 26 J. SOC. SCI. I (1890); Arthur T. Hadley, Private Monopolies and Private
Rights, I Q. J. ECON. 28 (1887). An excellent modem history is Herbert Hovenkamp, Technology, Politics,
and Regulated Monopoly: An American Historical Perspective, 62 TEX. L. REV. 1263 (1984). Of course, long
before Mill, it was well recognized outside of political economists, by Lord Hale and others, that certain indus-
tries should be operated exclusively under Crown franchise grants, price regulated, and forced to serve all cus-
tomers willing to pay.
18. Hovenkamp, supra note 17, at 1270. See also Richard T. Ely, The Nature and Significance of the
Corporation, 75 HARPER'S MAG. 71 (1887); Henry Carter Adams, Relation of the State to Industrial Action,
PUB. AM. ECON. A., Jan. 1887, at 55.
19. PLATT, supra note 16, at 22-25, 69-70, 74-82. As Platt suggests, such horizontal integration was
dependent on the development of AC current, allowing the extension of electricity transmission beyond a mile
and a half, and the technology of central station coordination. Id. In addition, a large degree of horizontal in-
tegration has been externally established through informal coordination and contractual pooling. Id at 72-74.
For example, it is commonplace for vertically-integrated utilities to functionally and operationally integrate
with other separately owned utilities through long-term cooperative activities and long-term contractual ar-
rangements governing transmission. PAUL L. JOSKOW & RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, MARKETS FOR POWER: AN
ANALYSIS OF ELECTRICAL UTILITY DEREGULATION 26 (1983).
20. See also PLATT. supra note 16, at 74 (noting that Insull's approach "represented a practical applica-
tion of a novel economic and constitutional theory of'natural' monopoly").
2000]
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tain reliable service. The vertical integration of generation and transmission is
the market's recognition of two technical phenomena that make de-integration
costly: (1) "electrical equilibrium," the transmission stasis necessary to avoid
blackout, requires that the sum of power demanded must equal the sum of power
supplied at generation buses minus the amount of power lost in transmission;
and (2) individual generators cannot physically direct their output to any par-
ticular customer or demand point. A vertically integrated generation and trans-
mission utility is able to economize on these technical complexities by engaging
in "economic dispatch" (utilizing the least expensive generator to meet its cus-
tomer demands), monitoring generation to maintain internal electrical equilib-
rium, and diversifying its contracts to allow an operationally flexible combina-
tion of generation capacity to meet its customer load. For these reasons, the
generation and transmission utility is virtually universal in the industry, although
some utilities also extend their vertical integration to the distribution of power.2!
This high degree of vertical integration in the industry minimizes the costs of
contracting by internalizing costs, many of which are informational, 22 within a
single firm.
These economic rationales favor high degrees of vertical and horizontal in-
tegration in the electricity industry. The integration of constituent services and a
geographic franchise under the rubric of a single firm, however, also calls for
some degree of franchise and price regulation to control monopoly abuses. Un-
der the traditional approach, regulators define a franchise service area for a pub-
23lic utility guaranteeing it access to customers within this area. Once a franchise
is defined, the traditional approach to regulating the electric utility is to regulate
rates in a manner designed to approximate the results of a competitive market-
i.e., to set price as close as possible to long-run marginal economic cost, includ-
ing a normal rate of return on capital.24
B. Efficiency of the Duty to Serve Within the Natural Monopoly Framework
Natural monopoly regulation peacefully coexists with the obligations im-
posed by the duty to serve because, within the natural monopoly framework, the
firm's incentives to extend and continue service are compatible with regulators'
goals of ensuring the lowest prices for customers. In this sense, price regulation
simply provides the firm with incentives to act in accordance with what the
regulators believe is in the public interest, since private and public interests in
21. Investor-owned utilities commonly integrate distribution with generation and transmission. It is
typical for cooperative and municipal utilities to separate distribution from generation and transmission. Al-
though distribution facilities may be separately owned, they are typically linked with the generation and trans-
mission firm by long-term requirements contracts. JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 19, at 113 (observing
that "[v]ertical integration between generation and transmission is virtually universal").
22. See generally MARK CASSON, INFORMATION AND ORGANIZATION: A NEW PERSPECTIVE ON THE
THEORY OF THE FIRM (1997) (offering the theory of the firm as a system of structured information flows).
23. See generally CHARLES F. PHILLIPS, JR., THE REGULATION OF PUBLIC UTILITIES: THEORY AND
PRACTICE 563-64 (1993).
24. Marginal cost includes both the cost of delivering power and the cost of reserve capacity to ensure
reliable supply. The cost of reserve capacity, often a fixed monthly charge for customers, does not vary based
on customer usage. Reserves may be paid for through an ancillary service charge or a capacity charge on cus-
tomer bills.
[Vol. 21:27
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service provision converge. Although politically stable, this convergence also
has some basis in economic efficiency.
Under the natural monopoly regulatory framework, the duty to extend
service, even where it is not immediately profitable, can be economically effi-
cient. Prohibitions on direct competition with a utility increase system stability
and reliability, minimizing some of the costs of vertical coordination, and de-
crease horizontal coordination costs by ensuring that only a few adjacent utilities
are parties to any power pool. In return, customers must be guaranteed access to
power supply and distribution services if requested, since these services are bun-
dled together and provided by a single firm.
The duty to extend service might thus be seen as economically efficient be-
cause of the industry's structure and the regulators' approach to preserving this
structure through natural monopoly regulation. As Richard Epstein has sug-
gested, "the obligation of universal service to all comers is the obvious and ef-
fective way to overcome the holdout advantage that common carriers would oth-
erwise possess against their customers. 25 Put another way, utilities subject to a
duty to extend service are not given an ordinary property right to exclude. In-
stead, the utility is protected by a liability rule, which allows customers to take
service on demand in return for compensation, as determined through an elabo-
rate ratemaking system. Effectively, service extension obligations are imposed
on the utility, rather than assumed by the consumer, because the utility is better
positioned to spread the costs of extension among multiple customers. This in
turn minimizes the wealth impact on poorer customers, whose marginal utility of
money is relatively high.26
Cost spreading is a primary rationale behind the extension obligation appli-
cable to utilities, but service continuation obligations are understood by analo-
gizing to long-term bilateral contracts between a supplier and a buyer and the
identification of the superior risk bearer.27  In industries with large up-front
capital investments, long-term contracts are necessary to entice suppliers to
make investments. Without long-term contracts, guaranteeing a reliable pool of
buyers of goods, many suppliers would not make the necessary capital invest-
ments to produce or distribute such goods. For example, in the natural gas in-
dustry, long-term contracts between pipelines and local distribution companies
were essential to financing the national pipeline infrastructure.
28
As is ordinary in practice, long-term contracts in private industries are often
negotiated so as to allow flexibility in either price or quantity. The extended du-
ration of such contracts pose problems for planning risk management as "gaps"
25. Richard A. Epstein, A Clear View from The Cathedral: The Dominance of Property Rules, 106
YALE L.J. 2091,2118 (1997).
26. On the economic basis of loss (or cost) spreading, see GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF
ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). Loss spreading will be desirable when not all per-
sons sharing in the costs of a social policy possess identical marginal utilities of money and where there is con-
cem with minimizing the impact on certain sub-populations, such as low-income persons.
27. The analogy is made in Goldberg, supra note 11; Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Bidding for Natu-
ral Monopolies-In General and with Respect to CA TV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73 (1976).
28. Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Reconstituting the Natural Gas Industry from Wellhead to Burnertip, 9
ENERGY L.J. 1, 11-16 (1988).
2000]
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in such contracts will always exist. For sales of goods, once service under such a
contract commences, a supplier has an obligation to continue to meet reasonable
demands for services and not renege on this obligation if a more profitable alter-
native comes along.29 For example, assume that a seller has agreed to supply all
of a buyer's coal requirements for a twenty-year period. The parties base their
price-per-ton figure on a Department of Labor price index. However, over time,
incidents such as oil embargoes and inflation cause the supplier's production
costs to exceed the agreed index, so that if the seller continues to perform it will
suffer substantial losses. Nevertheless, the approach of some courts in reviewing
such contracts has been to hold the seller completely responsible and to grant
specific performance. 30 Thus, in the long-term contract context, some courts
have in effect enforced a service continuation obligation even in the face of sub-
stantial economic losses to the seller.3'
This approach to enforcing contracts has some efficiency basis in the long-
term contract context where the seller is the superior risk bearer.32 In the electric
utility context, the long-term agreement is endorsed by a regulatory authority
between a utility and its customers, which is known as the regulatory compact.
One of the parties to this hypothetical agreement, the utility, is a rate-regulated
monopolist. Compared with the end use customer, the utility is the superior risk
bearer with respect to changes in the supply of electricity and the technological
aspects of transmission and distribution. The customer, though, may be the bet-
ter risk bearer with respect to its unforeseeable uses of the utility's service. At
the same time, as between the utility and customers, the utility is in a better po-
sition to spread any loses associated with service cut-off among multiple cus-
tomers, especially where those losses might have an impact on low-income rate-
payers or small businesses. A general utility obligation to continue service and
to pay for foreseeable damages places the risk of shut-off on the superior risk
bearer and cost spreader.33 The utility, then, can attempt to seek compensation
for these risks and costs through regulated rates, while also providing customers
adequate opportunities to contest service curtailment or to seek an alternative
supplier.
Although under traditional franchise and price regulation a general duty to
serve has some economic efficiency grounds, one of the economic problems cre-
ated by a service extension and continuation obligation is cross-subsidization.
29. See, e.g., U.C.C. § 2-306.
30. Missouri Pub. Ser. Co. v. Peabody Coal Co., 583 S.W.2d 721 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); Iowa Electric
Light & Power Co. v. Atlas Corp., 467 F. Supp. 129 (N.D. Iowa 1978).
31. Paul L. Joskow, Commercial Impossibility, The Uranium Market, and the Westinghouse Case, 6 J.
LEG. STUD. 119 (1977) (discussing commercial impracticability defense under § 2-615 of the U.C.C.). Accord
U.C.C. § 2-306, comment 2 (noting that elasticity or requirements to "curtail losses" may constitute breach).
32. Richard E. Speidel, Court-Imposed Price Adjustments Under Long-Term Supply Contracts, 76 Nw.
U. L. REv. 369, 381-94 (198 1); see also Richard Posner & Andrew M. Rosenfield, Impossibility and Related
Doctrines in Contract Lmv: An Economic Analysis, 6 J. LEG. STUD. 83 (1977) (describing a superior risk
bearer as the party in the best position to prevent a risk from materializing).
33. With respect to service continuation, the utility is not only the superior risk bearer, but also the supe-
rior cost spreader. In most cases it will be desirable to impose continuation obligations on the utility, except in
those instances where the customer is, on average, the superior risk bearer and the gains from requiring cus-
tomers to bear the risks of shut off exceed any loss spreading gains from imposing the obligation on the utility.
[Vol. 21:27
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Price regulation of electric utilities, like regulation of other types of public utili-
ties, focuses on setting prices equal to the costs of providing service to the cus-
tomer. This approach to price regulation is necessary in natural monopoly mar-
kets-particularly those in which scale economies are present-because firms
otherwise face incentives to set costs higher and to produce lower quantities than
they would in competitive markets. The theoretical solution to this problem pre-
sented by neoclassical economics is to set the price equal to the marginal cost,
thus mimicking the result of a competitive market. Yet, with economies of
scale, the revenues from marginal cost pricing will fall short of the total costs of
a firm's outputs. 34 In such contexts, regulators have relied on a body of analysis
known as "Ramsey pricing," which recognizes that in the presence of scale
economies firms would lose money if they were required to set prices at mar-
ginal costs and attempts to identify a set of prices that yield adequate revenue for
a firm to cover all of its costs.35
With respect to the service extension obligation, customers who may not
benefit from service extension may be allocated a portion of the fixed costs of
extension, which are built into the fixed cost component of their rates. However,
contribution requirements, imposed by many regulators, limit the degree to
which utilities can subsidize service extension by increasing rates for all custom-
ers. The traditional ratemaking process, in which the impacts and cost-
effectiveness of intra- and inter-class cross-subsidization are litigated, also works
to minimize the degree of cross-subsidization resulting from the service exten-
sion obligation.
In addition, the service continuation obligation facilitates intra-class cross-
subsidization by building into all customers' rates the costs of customers who
cannot afford to pay the full costs of their bills. Although this likely leads to
mismatches between any one customer's costs and rates, it allows utilities to
spread these risks among all customers. When a utility removes a customer who
cannot afford full payment from its system by disconnecting service, two things
occur: (1) the utility avoids the variable costs of producing energy, typically the
price of the fuel required to deliver the units of energy to the customer; and (2)
since service continuation gives the utility leverage in collection, the utility for-
goes any revenue that it might have been able to collect from the household if
service were continued. So, assuming excess capacity, there may be a general
economic advantage to all ratepayers in keeping as many customers as possible
34. KENNETH E. TRAIN, OPTIMAL REGULATION: THE ECONOMIC THEORY OF NATURAL MONOPOLY 14-
15 (1991); DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 869-71
(1994).
35. The theory was first presented for analyzing tax policy by a young Cambridge philosopher, Frank
Ramsey, who produced contributions to probability theory, combinatorial analysis, geometry, and economics
before his death at 26. The original idea is presented in Frank Ramsey, A Contribution to the Theory of Taxa-
tion, 37 ECON. J. 47 (1927). For subsequent reviews of the idea in the literature, see William J. Baumol. Ram-
sey Pricing, in 3 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 49-51 (John Eatwell, Murray Milgate &
Peter Newman eds. 1987); William J. Baumol & David F. Bradford, Optimal Departures from Marginal Cost
Pricing, 60 AM. EcoN. REV. 265 (1970). For regulators, Ramsey pricing has been utilized as "a prescription
for deriving those prices whose deviations from marginal cost will serve the public interest where scale econo-
mies are present." WILLIAM J. BAUMOL & J. GREGORY SIDAK, TRANSMISSION PRICING AND STRANDED COSTS
IN THE ELECTRIC POWER INDUSTRY 33 (1995).
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on the system. Service continuation obligations allow the utility to spread fixed
costs (for existing capacity) over a larger number of customers and to reduce the
portion of each customer's bill allocated to fixed costs.36 Thus, even in the event
of under-payment, it may be cost-effective for a utility with excess capacity to
continue service to a customer and to accommodate the customer who cannot af-
ford service at cost by working out a partial payment plan, so long as it is rea-
sonably expected that the customer can pay at least the variable cost of service.
Cross-subsidization is a necessary result of the duty to serve, but the im-
pacts of cross-subsidization have been minimized by contribution requirements,
the ratemaking process, and cost-effectiveness considerations. Although there
are inevitable cross-subsidization costs associated with the duty to serve, regu-
lators have had to strike a balance to ensure that the benefits of universal access
to utility service offset these costs. Thus, the duty to serve has led a relatively
peaceful coexistence with franchise and price regulation under the natural mo-
nopoly paradigm.
III. RETAIL WHEELING AND UNIVERSAL SERVICE IN ELECTRICITY: REFIN(-
ANC)ING THE DUTY TO SERVE FOR A POST-PUBLIC UTILITY ERA IN
ELECTRICITY
The dawn of competition in electricity raises a tension for the common law
duty to serve, historically protected by natural monopoly regulation. In com-
petitive retail power and natural gas markets, the traditional economic efficiency
arguments in favor of imposing extraordinary service obligations must be reas-
sessed in light of structural modifications to the industry.
It is tempting for regulators addressing the obligations of firms in electricity
markets to look to other markets in which they have experience, such as tele-
communications, where universal service is often regarded as coexisting with
retail competition. However, one of the primary network efficiency rationales
for universal service in telecommunications is inapplicable to physical energy
network markets, such as electricity and natural gas. To the extent that extraor-
dinary service obligations are continued for electricity and natural gas in the
same manner that they have been for the past hundred years, regulators will need
to articulate alternative economic efficiency justifications or will need to explic-
itly embrace goals outside of economic efficiency, such as fairness or distribu-
tive justice.
A. The Tension Posed by the Duty to Serve in Retail Markets
Wholesale transmission access and competition among wholesale suppliers
has not posed any immediate threat to the public utility's duty to serve,37 but the
36. Roger Colton, A Cost-Based Response to Low-Income Energ, Problems, 27 PUB. UTIL. FORT., Mar.
1, 1991, at 31.
37. Since FERC Order No. 888, wholesale access and supply competition occur under the FERC's open
access policies, which require a transmission utility to offer transmission service to customers and suppliers at
terms and conditions comparable to the service it offers its own power supply. Promoting Wholesale Competi-
tion Through Open Access Non-Discriminatory Transmission Services by Public Utilities and Transmitting
Utilities, 61 Fed. Reg. 21,540 (May 10, 1996) (codified at 18 C.F.R. pts. 35, 385 (1997)). Under prior regula-
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introduction of retail competition requires some reassessment of the intellectual
foundations for, and practical application of, the traditional duty to serve. The
California Public Utility Commission's (CPUC) first order leading to the adop-
tion of retail choice legislation acknowledged the need for consideration of this
issue as customers begin to shop for power:
To allow eligible customers to choose without restriction between the regulated
price for a bundled utility service and the price offered by the generation services
market may severely reduce the utility's ability to plan for, and reliably serve, its
remaining customers. Absent modifications to the compact's traditional duty to
service, consumers may make choices about electric services which they find eco-
nomically attractive, but which are undesirable with respect to the broader goal of
allocating society's resources efficiently.38
The possibility of such uneconomic bypass (bypass that might work to
lower costs for a single shopping customer while raising average costs for other
customers)39 may necessitate some consideration of'the costs of the traditional
duty to serve. Moreover, a system that allows power suppliers and customers to
choose to deal with each other, especially if left unregulated, may allow suppli-
ers or distributors to elect never to serve certain classes of customers, such as
low-income residents, or to cease service however they wish consistent with re-
tail power sales agreements.
Of course, perceived conflicts between vigorous retail competition and
customer access can be avoided to the extent that one of these seemingly incom-
patible goals is simply abandoned. Since it is not likely that the movement to-
wards retail competition in traditional public utility industries will cease, one
option in the face of the tension between retail competition and common law
service obligations is to abandon the duty to serve for competitive markets,
treating traditional utility services as any other service in a competitive market.
After all, as retail markets open up, it will be increasingly possible for suppliers
and distributors to provide a variety of service qualities to end users. Without a
duty to serve, utility markets might operate much like other deregulated markets,
such as trucking and banking, which rely on contractual obligations and general
consumer protection laws to ensure service delivery. For example, if an elec-
tricity supplier refuses service to a customer, the customer must find alternative
suppliers, and competition in power generation will likely provide customers a
range of power supply qualities.40  Should a power distributor (known as a
tory structures, competition at the wholesale level may have had potentially adverse impacts on service obliga-
tions. Bouknight & Raskin, supra note 7. at 239 (noting that "to the extent that existing obligations are incon-
sistent with a system of free and fair competition the Congress and the FERC must address the issue").
38. Re Proposed Policies Governing Restructuring of California's Electric Services Industry and Re-
forming Regulation, 151 P.U.R.4th 73,92 (Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n 1994).
39. Uneconomic bypass has been defined as bypass that reduces costs to one customer but increases
overall average network costs, thus creating costs for other customers. Paul W. MacAvoy, Daniel F. Spulber &
Bruce E. Stangle, Is Competitive Entry Free? Bypass and Partial Deregulation in Natural Gas Markets, 6
YALE J. ON REG. 209, 244 (1989).
40. Some suggest that traditional rate regulation has had an adverse effect on the average quality of
service. See generally ANDREW S. CARRON & PAUL W. MACAVOY, THE DECLINE OF SERVICE IN REGULATED
INDUSTRIES (1981) (chronicling a decline in service quality throughout the 1970s). Notably, in England, which
deregulated its electricity industry through privatization in 1991, service disconnections fell by 95% over the
first few years of deregulation. See also KENNETH W. COSTELLO & ROBERT J. GRANIERE, DEREGULATION-
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DisCo) refuse to extend or discontinue service to a customer because it is not
profitable, the customer may also attempt to find alternatives. For example, for
large, heavy load customers of electricity, alternatives such as self-generation or
wheeling around the DisCo may be cost feasible. Markets flourish with bilateral
relationships, while the duty to serve imposes a unilateral obligation on the in-
cumbent utility. Customers already have a variety of safeguards, including
credit financing and consumer protection statutes, such as the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.4'
Though a challenge, it is not an impossible task for regulators to establish
extraordinary service obligations in competitive retail industries. Many insur-
ance industries provide for universal service through various sorts of assigned
risk pools. For example, the property insurance industry has developed Fair Ac-
cess to Insurance Requirements (FAIR) plans.42 In the hospital industry, the ob-
ligation of hospitals to serve the indigent is explicitly made a condition in the
awarding of federal construction grants. 43 Nonprofit health care providers take
on an obligation to provide indigent health care, partly as a condition to the grant4
of certain governmental benefits, such as federal, state, or local tax benefits. It
may be questionable how successful these approaches to promoting universal
service have been, but their existence suggests that the duty to serve can coexist
with retail competition.
B. The Efficiency of Universal Service in Telecommunications Networks
In the telecommunications industry, the extraordinary obligations applica-
ble to service providers have come to be known as "universal service," recently
RESTRUCTURING: EVIDENCE FROM INDIVIDUAL INDUSTRIES 14 (1997).
41. For example, express and implied warranty protections appear in both state and federal law. See,
e.g., U.C.C. § 2-313 (express warranty); § 2-314 (implied warranty of merchantability); § 2-315 (implied war-
ranty of fitness for particular purpose); § 2-318 (extension of warranties to third party beneficiaries expected to
use goods); see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1999) (Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act, regulating explicit and
implied warranties). In addition federal law prohibits "unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive
acts or practices in or affecting commerce." 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (1999). All states have similar statutes protect-
ing against unfair trade acts. The Federal Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691-1691e, and the Fair
Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1999), establish minimum standards that prevent discrimination in the
granting of credit and consumer safeguards. See also 15 U.S.C. ch. 41 (Consumer Credit Protection Act); 15
U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o (1999) (Fair Credit Debt Collection Act); 15 U.S.C. § 1637 (1999) (Fair Credit Billing
Act). State regulation of finance charges, credit terms and the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C.
§ 1602(f) (1999), have historically not applied to public utilities because these laws contain a stricter definition
of credit designed to capture transactions in which both parties intend that payment will be delayed and finance
charges imposed as a part of a lengthened payment schedule. In competitive markets, though, retail electricity
suppliers and distributors may devise payment plans that resemble credit sale transactions or sponsor open-
ended credit plans for the sale of electricity which could trigger TILA disclosure and disputed bill procedures.
42. The FAIR plan was created under the Urban Property Protection and Reinsurance Act of 1968, Pub.
L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 555 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 12, 15, and 42 U.S.C.). For discus-
sion, see generally Regina Austin, The Insurance Classification Controversy, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 517 (1983).
43. The Hill-Burton Act conditions the funding of hospital construction on the provision of uncompen-
sated care to indigent citizens. 42 U.S.C. § 291 (1999). In addition, a federal law called the Emergency Medi-
cal Treatment and Active Labor Act, adopted in 1986, requires Medicare-participating hospitals to examine and
treat all emergency room patients and women in labor. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1999).
44. James Simpson & Sarah Strum, How Good a Samaritan? Federal Income Tax Exemption for
Charitable Hospitals Reconsidered 14 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 633 (1991).
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endorsed by the U.S. Congress in the Telecommunications Act of 1996.45 The
rationale for universal service in telecommunications is independent of natural
monopoly regulation.
In the telecommunications context, the predominant economic rationale for
a universal service obligation is that pervasive access increases network system
benefits for all customers.46 Basically, the idea is that a service obligation on
providers of telecommunications service enhances the value of network service
for all customers to such a degree that customers are willing to pay a premium to
subsidize universal access. The Federal Communications Commission (FCC), in
its 1997 universal service order, recognized this economic rationale:
Universal service support mechanisms that are designed to increase subscribership
by keeping rates affordable will benefit everyone in the country, including those
who can afford basic service. At the simplest level, increasing the number of peo-
ple connected to the telecommunications network makes the network more valuable
to all its users by increasing its usefulness to them. Increasing subscribership also
benefits society in ways unrelated to the value of the network per se. For example,
all of us benefit from the widespread availability of basic public safety services,
such as 911.47
Because the value of telecommunications service increases to customers
with greater degrees of system interconnectivity, universal service is regarded as
economically valuable by telecommunications firms and customers, even those
who can afford market-priced services. Put another way, universal service cre-
ates a positive externality, which inures to the benefit of all customers through
pervasive interconnectivity. For example, the more pervasive access to the
Internet, the more valuable the Internet is as a communications tool, everything
else being equal.48
While intuitively attractive, this rationale is not without its problems. First,
there is clearly some limit on the amount the average consumer is willing to pay
to subsidize universal service. At some point, the marginal benefits of enhanced
access will not justify the additional cost. For example, expansion of a network
initially financed by middle-class customers to include the poor, particular those
with whom middle-class customers rarely interact, will likely provide few bene-
fits of the sort that the average middle-class customer will be willing to pay for.
45. Telecommunications Act of 1996, § 254, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1986) (directing the
Federal Communications Commission to define "universal service," consistent with principles in statute). This
provision was the subject of deliberations of a joint federal/state board and FCC rules issued in 1997. In re
Federal-State Joint Board on Universal Service. FCC Docket No. 96-45 (May 7, 1997). These rules have been
clarified in several orders on reconsideration, most recently in December 1997. In re Federal-State Joint Board
on Universal Service, FCC Docket No. 96-45 (Dec. 30, 1997). For criticism of this new statutory provision,
see MILTON J. MUELLER, JR., UNIVERSAL SERVICE: COMPETITION, INTERCONNECTION, AND MONOPOLY IN
THE MAKING OF THE AMERICAN TELEPHONE SYSTEM (1997). Additional papers and comments regarding uni-
versal service are available through the Benton Foundation (visited Feb. 1, 1998) <http://www.benton.org/>.
46. For an integrated discussion of network economic effects in several areas of the law, see Mark A.
Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 479 (1998).
47. In re Federal-State Joint Bd. on Universal Serv., FCC Docket No. 96-45, slip op. at 8, 8 (May 7,
1997).
48. So too with the fax machine, an appliance that only became valuable once it was distributed among
multiple persons connected by a network. Kevin Kelly, New Rules for the New Economy, WIRED, Sept. 1997,
at 140, 142-43.
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The average-middle class customer who can afford to pay for its own access will
likely not be willing to pay a significant premium to enhance access for others
unless there is some cognizable benefit to the network system or to the value of
service. Empirically, it is unclear how much the average consumer is willing to
pay to subsidize universal service. Clearly there are some limitations on the
willingness of consumers to pay for system benefits, but, without empirical
study, this theory fails to provide a clear criterion for limiting its extension. For
example, taken to its extreme it could require not only subsidization of the net-
work, but a redistributive tax to pay to provide computers or other electronic de-
vices to customers who cannot afford to pay for these. While such a tax may
seem desirable as a matter of fairness or distributive justice, it is hardly required
by economic efficiency.
A second limitation with this rationale for universal service in the telecom-
munications context is that it does not factor in network congestion costs. If the
infrastructure is already in place to accommodate additional customers at a low
incremental cost, the positive externality rationale provides a powerful incentive
for enhancing access. However, with limited infrastructure, additional partici-
pants may actually cause the value of service for incumbent customers to decline
if congestion ensues or if the quality of service is otherwise adversely affected.
In the Internet context, for example, the congestion bottlenecks resulting from
mass access to system networks are obvious.
These problems aside, while this positive externality rationale for universal
service might explain why consumers, in a nonregulated context, may be willing
to pay for cross-subsidization of universal service in telecommunications, it is, at
best, a tenuous argument for supporting a duty to serve in the natural gas and
electricity industries. Under traditional public utility regulation, the consump-
tion of gas and electricity commodities, unlike communications services, do not
depend on interconnectivity for their value. Additional customers might make
certain secondary markets possible-Circuit City would not exist if customers
did not have circuits 4 -and this may stimulate demand for electricity or natural
gas. Moreover, as is discussed above, increasing the number of customers on a
network may work to decrease the fixed costs associated with providing electric
or natural gas service, reducing the price each customer pays in a rate-regulated
environment. However, any individual customer can obtain great value from
utilizing electrical or natural gas appliances in complete isolation. An electrical
generator, for example, can easily power a home or office, so long as adequate
fuel is available. Thus, although some economic benefits to pervasive access can
be identified for these industries, they relate primarily to the costs and supply of
network service, not to its demand value or the amount customers are willing to
pay for universal service. To this extent, the positive externality argument for
universal service is weak when applied to commodities like electricity and natu-
ral gas outside the natural monopoly framework--or, at least in this context,
universal service demands some alternative economic explanation.
49. The author wishes to thank his colleague Larry Garvin for putting it to him this way.
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C. Efficiency and Universal Service in a Competitive Retail Market Framework
To date, those states that have addressed retail competition in power mar-
kets have expressed an awareness of the potential tension between the common
law duty to serve and competitive retail markets without abandoning either goal.
California stated in the preamble to its 1996 retail wheeling legislation, "[i]t is
the further intent of the Legislature to continue to fund low-income ratepayer as-
sistance programs, ... in an unbundled manner.. ."and maintained 1996-level
low-income and universal service expenditures.5 0 New Hampshire, which con-
sidered similar legislation, was more explicit:
A restructured electric utility industry should provide adequate safeguards to assure
universal service. Minimum residential service safeguards and protections should
be maintained. Programs and mechanisms that enable residential customers with
low incomes to manage and afford essential electricity requirements should be in-
cluded as part of industry restructuring.51
The task of formulating extraordinary service obligations in an era of retail
competition is not an impossible one. It should not preclude consideration of
retail competition by states, nor should it necessarily lead to the abandonment of
extraordinary service obligations. In fact, the introduction of retail competition
may even lead to the enhancement of consumer protection obligations, perhaps
from fear of the abuses markets may yield. 2
Although the rationales applicable to the telecommunications industry are
inapposite in competitive electricity markets, there are some economic efficiency
rationales supporting continuation of the duty to service in competitive retail
power markets. To understand how extraordinary service obligations will apply
in the context of a competitive retail power market, some understanding of this
market's operational framework is necessary. While the DisCo is often thought
to remain a natural monopolist, generation, power supply, marketing, brokering,
and energy services are today regarded as competitive industries. Since de-
regulation of the electricity industry acknowledges different market characteris-
tics for different market actors, the traditional approach to implementing service
obligations requires some reassessment. Equal application of a duty to every in-
stitutional actor providing electric utility services in competitive retail markets
will pose significant economic costs and may thwart the development of retail
power markets. In particular, from an efficiency perspective, proposals endorsed
by many consumer advocates that suppliers or marketers assume extraordinary
service obligations54 are specious, since this aspect of the industry no longer ex-
50. CAL. A.B. No. 1890 (signed Sept. 23, 1996), at § (d).
51. N.H. STATE CODE § 374-F:3 V(a).
52. In Ohio, for example, the consideration of retail competition has mobilized consumer protection in-
terests, leading to the proposal of minimum electricity service standards for the first time in the state's history.
See Ohio Regs Set Service Standards, ELECTRICITY DAILY, Feb. 9, 1998, Alan Johnson, State Board Sets
Service Standards for Ohio's Electric Companies, COLUMBUS DISPATCH, Feb. 6, 1998, at 4E. See also Cam
Simpson, Thousands Without Heat in Area, CHI. SUN-TIMEs, Dec. 9, 1997, at I (noting that Illinois' restruc-
turing legislation contains new low-income customer assistance charges).
53. PETER FoX-PENNER, ELECTRIC UTILITY RESTRUCTURING: A GUIDE TO THE COMPETITIVE ERA 88
(1997).
54. See, e.g., ROGER D. COLTON, THE 'OBLIGATION TO SERVE' AND A COMPETITIVE ELECTRIC
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hibits natural monopoly characteristics. This does not mean, however, that uni-
versal service is without any economic efficiency basis.
Current state retail wheeling plans require, at a minimum, that the power
distribution sector of the industry assumes some extraordinary service obliga-
tion. There is little agreement among the states about whether the various mar-
ket institutions interacting with the DisCo in retail markets should also bear ex-
traordinary service obligations. Extraordinary service obligations can facilitate
access to power supply without undermining efficiency gains, but regulators
need to assess carefully the limits of service obligations in competitive markets.
Under most state restructuring plans, for small load customers, such as resi-
dential customers, small business, and single location offices, power distribution
remains a natural monopoly service. Put another way, a single utility (the
DisCo) will continue to provide distribution to supply power for the large bulk of
power customers. For most smaller customers who do not have access to capital
financing markets or own rights of way to build distribution lines, it is cost pro-
hibitive to duplicate distribution lines as long as the incumbent DisCo itself
owns the facilities." Thus, even in competitive retail markets, the DisCos will
initially remain natural monopolies for small residential and commercial cus-
tomers, at least with respect to the horizontal distribution market. 56  Following
California's approach, to date every state retail wheeling plan has treated power
distribution in this manner by defining a dejure monopoly for distribution, sub-
ject to fairly traditional regulation, effectively defining a new regulatory compact
for power distribution.
Further, to date every state that has seriously considered moving to retail
competition in the sale of electricity has determined that a "basic service" option
must be provided by the DisCo to those who do not choose an alternative sup-
plier for electricity, are refused service by a retail supplier, or have been discon-
nected.57 The DisCo is effectively the supplier of last resort. 58 In some states,
basic service will be regulated at a rate established to be less than the rates im-
mediately prior to competition, thusminimizing the impact of stranded costs on
INDUSTRY (Report of DOE Office of Economic, Electricity and Natural Gas Analysis, May 1997); BARBARA
ALEXANDER & THE NATIONAL CONSUMER LAW CENTER, CONSUMER PROTECTION PROPOSALS FOR RETAIL
ELECTRIC COMPETITION: MODEL LEGISLATION AND REGULATIONS (1996).
55. As Vernon Smith has argued, however, joint ventures may work to solve this problem. Vernon L.
Smith, Can Electric Power -. A "Natural Monopoly" - Be Deregulated. in MAKING NATIONAL ENERGY
POLICY 131 (Hans H. Landsberg ed. 1993).
56. FoX-PENNER, supra note 53, at 88 (citing recent reports by the FERC and the U.S. Office of Tech-
nology Assessment, as well as the conclusions of JOSKOW & SCHMALENSEE, supra note 19). However, not
everyone agrees. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 55. As suggested below, with the growth of micro-turbines and
distributed generation, some competition in power distribution will likely be inevitable. See discussion infra.
57. Basic service, or the standard offer, is independent of a "safety net" provided in many states for low
income customers. Unlike the safety net, basic service or the standard offer is designed to provide stable elec-
tricity service without major price fluctuations while, at the same time, providing sufficient education about the
available options and benefits of retail competition in electricity - to stimulate consumer choice and interest.
This approach to ensuring service access is similar to the minimum standard of coverage recommended in
health care reform. See generally John D. Rockefeller IV, A Call for Action: The Pepper Commission's Blue-
print for Health Care Reform, 26 JAMA 2507,2509 (1991).
58. A similar model is emerging in the natural gas industry. T.W. Merrill, Jr., Supplier of Last Resort:
Who, What. Why?, 137 PUB. UTIL. FORT., July 15, 1999, at 18.
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small residential customers. 59
For example, according to Vermont's retail competition restructuring order,
"exclusive franchises for distribution" remain necessary. The DisCo "will retain
its obligation to plan, build and operate its local distribution system in a manner
that ensures safe and reliable service to customers." 60 Vermont defines the "Ba-
sic Service Offer" as "[s]ervice offered to customers by the distribution company
but provided by a retail service provider through contract." This service "may be
priced either to float with the spot market or fixed on a longer term basis. 61
After the transition to retail competition, this offer, which is limited to franchised
customers of DisCos, "will be made available over a contracted period" and
"through a retail service provider."
62
Since retail competition envisions the fragmentation of utility service into
different markets, from generation to transmission to distribution, the implica-
tions of continuing the duty to serve will need to be assessed in the context of
each of these markets. Given power distribution's de jure monopoly status un-
der state retail wheeling plans, with little or no analysis most state regulators
look initially to the DisCo as the primary bearer of the traditional duty to serve.
However, given the inapplicability of the traditional rate regulation framework
for understanding service obligations in the competitive market structure, cou-
pled with the mobilization of interests likely to support imposition of new serv-
ice obligations, the objective efficiency rationales for continuing to impose an
extraordinary service obligation on the incumbent utility require reassessment.
1. Cost Spreading and the Efficiency of Universal Power Distribution
Service, But Not Generation
Consider, first, the economic rationales for imposing service extension ob-
ligations. Since the DisCo maintains a horizontal monopoly with respect to
rights of way and essential network facilities, most customers will continue to
have a need for access to distribution from it. At the same time, the DisCo will
be in a better position than suppliers or others to spread the costs of service ex-
tension, minimizing the economic impact of the distribution network on custom-
ers, particularly the poor. Customers, on average, are likely to have higher mar-
ginal utilities of money than the DisCo, so imposition on the DisCo of an
obligation to provide service and spread the costs may maximize social welfare.
So even in a competitive retail market, economic efficiency rationales for re-
quiring the DisCo to extend its distribution network to customers seem to con-
tinue. It should be noted, though, that in a deregulated environment where
power supply is competitive, the access and cost spreading rationales for the ex-
tension obligation apply to distribution service only, not to competitively pro-
vided power supply. Put another way, despite an economic rationale for requir-
59. See, e.g., R.I. GEN LAWS ch. 316, § 39-1-27.2(d) & (1); Re Electric Utility Industry Restructuring,
No. 95-462 (Me. Pub. Util. Comm'n July 19, 1996).
60. Re Restructuring of the Electric Utility Industry in Vermont, 174 P.U.R.4th 409, 434 (Vt. Pub. Serv.
Bd. 1996).
61. Id. at 488.
62. Restructuring in Vermont, 174 P.U.R.4th at 427.
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ing the DisCo to assume some distribution service extension obligation, eco-
nomic analysis does not require the DisCo to also provide power supply. Thus,
without further exploration of the structure of retail power markets, there does
not appear to be a strong economic rationale for requiring the DisCo to build
generation facilities or procure power supply to serve customers. Nevertheless,
to the extent regulators decide to impose basic service obligations on some in-
stitutional actor in competitive power markets, the DisCo may also be in the best
position to spread the costs associated with basic service.
2. Reassessing the Efficiency of Service Continuation Obligations
With respect to service continuation, the second obligation of the traditional
duty to serve, the economic efficiency rationales behind the obligation also re-
quire some reassessment. Recall that one of the primary economic efficiency
rationales for imposing extraordinary service continuation obligations relates to
the utility's status as the superior risk bearer vis-a-vis the customer.63 In de-
regulated power markets, however, the long-term contract analogy that under-
girds application of superior risk bearer analysis to the regulatory compact loses
much of its relevance, since customers themselves may select power suppliers on
a month-to-month basis.
Further, in a competitive retail market, the same rationales cannot justify
imposition of an obligation on a private firm to provide full service at a price
below total costs, as often applied under rate regulation. Now, as has been ob-
served, there may be some continuing advantage to avoiding power shut off to
the extent that a customer is able to pay the variable portion of the costs associ-
ated with the supply and distribution of power. This cost sharing advantage,
however, is significantly reduced in a competitive market where power suppliers
face alternative customers for their capacity; it may apply to distribution service,
but absent excess capacity committed to DisCo customers it does not apply to
power supply.
3. Operational and Reliability Efficiencies
Despite these structural and regulatory differences between a competitive
market and the traditional regulated industry, efficiency arguments support im-
position of some service continuation obligation on the DisCo or other suppliers
in a competitive environment. With respect to service discontinuation, the
physics of power flow may require the DisCo to bear some responsibility if its
grid has not been modernized. Once power is supplied to a distribution grid
without computerized customer metering, the DisCo is automatically the sup-
plier of last resort to the retail customer; the customer will continue to receive
power until it is physically disconnected by the DisCo. So, in certain areas,
technology may necessitate some DisCo service continuation obligation.
4. Informational Efficiencies
Another rationale for imposition of a service continuation obligation is that
63. Of course, to the extent that utility risk bearing is desirable, a cost spreading rationale applies as
well.
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power markets may yield poor information. Assuming that customers have good
information about power supply options and the terms of power supply sales
contracts, when compared to the DisCo, the customer will be the superior bearer
of the risks of service shut off. The customer can purchase supply plans that
provide for early warning or, if necessary, insurance to cover the risks of prop-
erty or other damage due to a loss of power. Many customers, though, may not
have adequate information about power supply markets so as to react to the risks
of shut off, particularly where shut off is due to technological failure or emer-
gencies. In addition, in competitive power markets, consumers are unlikely to
possess the knowledge or experience to react to this information when some re-
action, such as the purchasing of power insurance or backup supply options, is in
order. Poor information or consumer discounting of risks may require the DisCo
or a supplier to assume some service continuation obligation, even in a competi-
tive power supply market. This will be especially true as these markets initially
evolve and as regulators embark on the task of educating consumers.
5. Efficient Welfare Policy
Further, given that a welfare system already exists in our market economy,
the imposition of service continuation obligations in a competitive power supply
market might work to mitigate the incentives the welfare system produces for
taking excessive credit risks. As competitive power markets evolve, consumers
are likely to be offered credit financing plans for electricity akin to many of the
financing plans available for other purchases, such as the purchase of an auto-
mobile. Offerers of such sales are likely to provide creative financing options,
often offering consumers who are poor credit risks high-cost financing plans.
Such risks, to the extent they are repeatedly presented to low-income consumers
in a competitive power supply market, will also increase the incidence of default,
especially since utilities will not face the same incentives as under rate regulation
to continue service with acceptance of partial payment. As customers increas-
ingly default and lose the basic necessities of life, such as electricity service,
over time this could both drive up the cost of the welfare system and undermine
its poverty reduction goal.64 Thus, imposition of a service continuation obliga-
tion, even in a competitive market, might be seen as a way of reducing the costs
of public welfare programs.
So, although reassessment is necessary, economic efficiency arguments for
continuing with some extraordinary service obligations in competitive markets
are not completely irrelevant. To the extent economic arguments exist, though,
they relate primarily to horizontal integration and the quality of information con-
sumers will likely possess, as with retail competition the market facilitates many
of the transactions which the traditional public utility previously coordinated
within a single, vertically integrated firm.
6. Monitoring Costs
Beyond these efficiency rationales for universal service in competitive
64. See generally Eric A. Posner, Contract Lmv in the Welfare State: A Defense of the Unconscionability
Doctrine, Usury Laws, and Related Limits on the Freedom to Contract, 24 J. LEG. STUD. 283 (1995).
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electricity markets, most of which focus on the structural nature of efficient
power markets, it must be acknowledged that with deregulation, regulators will
bear a heavier monitoring cost in implementing universal service goals for elec-
tricity. In contrast to the traditional regulatory structure, where a single natural
monopoly firm provided service to all customers within its service territory,
multiple firms will now provide a variety of services to these customers. In ad-
dition to the Disco, generating companies, power supply companies, and energy
service companies, as well as brokers and marketers, will now enter the power
markets. Any obligation imposed on entities beyond the DisCo will entail sig-
nificant monitoring costs for regulators.
7. The Limits of Efficiency: More Explicit Acknowledgment of Fairness
and Distributive Justice
To the extent regulators continue to adhere to the constituent obligations of
the common law duty, it is likely that they will also need to articulate non-
efficiency justifications, such as fairness or distributive justice, to support serv-
ice obligations in a competitive retail environment. In this sense, retail competi-
tion is likely to force more explicit discussion of the costs and benefits of ex-
traordinary service obligations than occurred under the traditional regulatory
compact. For example, in Ohio, the discussion of consumer service protections
has become explicit with the dawn of competition, while previously consumer
protections were often built into utility tariffs on a voluntary basis.
65
Some consumer advocates have proposed that states extend service obliga-
tions to suppliers, marketers, and brokers, and that the DisCos be required to
procure basic service power for consumers through mandated bidding criteria or
an allocation plan that accurately reflects market power. While there are legiti-
mate concerns that, in the provision of basic service, the DisCo may tend to fa-
vor any generation resources it owns over competitively supplied generation,
from an efficiency perspective there is no sound basis for extending utility serv-
ice obligations beyond the DisCo to power suppliers, marketers, and brokers.
Few states have been willing to require complete vertical disintegration, but,
even absent complete vertical disintegration, unbundling of DisCo power sales
and procurement can be achieved financially through requiring the DisCos with
generation to bid into a power exchange and to meet all basic power needs with
power exchange purchases. Competitive behavior can be minimized without ac-
tive regulatory oversight by requiring the DisCo to sell all of its power through a
power exchange, similar to California's. The power exchange ensures an active
spot and futures market for power, reflecting real time prices, and can also fa-
cilitate the formation of long-term contracts to meet basic service needs. The
power exchange, unlike other approaches, will price based entirely on the market
of supply and demand for power. If a DisCo is mandated to bid its power into
the exchange before selling basic service to customers, customers purchasing ba-
sic service would realize more of the benefits of competition than they would
under competitive bidding, because mandatory bidding into a power exchange
facilitates decoupling of a DisCo's basic service power purchases from power
65. See supra note 52.
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sales. Under such an approach, the DisCo has an adequate incentive to purchase
the lowest cost power from the exchange or it will risk losing basic service cus-
tomers to alternative suppliers if those customers opt to participate in the direct
retail purchase market. With such institutional reforms, imposition of a duty to
serve on the DisCos, to be financed through a system benefits charge, can work
simultaneously to facilitate the development of robust power supply markets and
pass the new efficiencies of these markets on to consumers without sacrificing
access goals.
To the extent a duty to serve continues to apply to the industry, on whatever
rationales, competitively priced retail power markets will work to minimize
many of the price distortions of cross-subsidization historically associated with
extraordinary service obligations. Under the natural monopoly framework, util-
ity service obligations were paid for through cross-subsidies, but rate regulation
helped to minimize the market distortions of this practice. Utilities generally
were not opposed to assuming service obligations, especially where they worked
to enlarge the customer base, so long as they could recover the costs of these ob-
ligations from some customers. With retail competition and a movement to
market-based pricing, cross-subsidization will continue to exist, but power sup-
ply markets will require the DisCos to minimize the impact of subsidies on cus-
tomers or risk losing customers, especially larger ones, to bypass or other suppli-
ers wheeling on the DisCo system.
IV. CONCLUSION
Cross-subsidies are not without controversy, but the fiction of the regula-
tory compact coupled with the economics of natural monopoly price regulation
have masked the redistributive nature of extraordinary utility service obligations
for the past hundred or so years. Under this regulatory framework, public and
private interests converged in maintenance of the duty to serve.
Following World War 1I, the public choice theory began to question the
orthodox understanding of government regulation generally and utility regula-
tion in particular, providing the intellectual tools for smashing the regulatory
compact in a variety of different industries.6 7 One of the predominant accounts
of the growth of utility regulation is regulatory capture - that utilities and other
interests, such as consumer groups, secure protection of their interests through
the political process by capturing regulation. For example, as Eli Noam has re-
66. Of course, not all DisCos are willing to accept the service obligations absent some compensation
guarantee. George R. Pleatt, Should Metering Stay at the Stand-Alone Disco?, 136 No. 3 PUB. UTIL. FORT.,
Feb. 1, 1998, at 44, 48 ("The most dangerous position for the disco would be as the backstop provider to cus-
tomers not effectively served by the market. This scenario is almost assured if the disco doesn't convince those
in power to remove the obligation to serve.").
67. Excellent accounts are provided in JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS & GOVERNANCE: USING
PUBLIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW (1997); DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P.FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC
CHOICE: A CRIrCAL INTRODUCTION (1991).
68. See generally Gary S. Becker, A Theory of Competition Among Pressure Groups for Political Influ-
ence, 98 Q.J. ECON. 371 (1983); Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. &
ECON. 211 (1976); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation. 2 BELL. J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3
(1971).
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cently suggested in the telecommunications context, there is a public choice ex-
planation for the existence of a redistributive universal service obligation in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996.69 Consumers and utilities may have formed a
coalition to secure legislative endorsement of the universal service requirement.
This inures to the benefit of the average consumer, who now has more pervasive
access through interconnectivity and also benefits utilities, as regulators allow
recovery of universal service costs by guaranteeing minimum service access
charges or rates. If this public choice explanation is applicable to national legis-
lation regulating telecommunications, it would seem even more plausible in the
regulation of electricity and natural gas commodities that have developed service
obligations primarily at the state level, where state legislatures are likely to be
more responsive than the U.S. Congress to the preferences, desires, and needs of
state consumers and industries. So modem endorsement of the duty to serve in
statutes and regulations in the electricity and natural gas contexts may have re-
sulted not from some public-spirited regulatory compact, but from utilities, con-
sumers, and their representatives securing, or capturing, a regulatory benefit
from the political process.
As this article has suggested, however, there may be economic efficiency
rationales for universal service in competitive telecommunications markets as
well as in emerging physical energy markets in electricity and natural gas, even
once the regulatory compact has been reassessed as a rationale for regulation.
Retail competition in most public utility industries, such as telecommunications,
natural gas, and electricity, is here to stay. With it the laws and regulatory con-
cepts invoked to regulate public utilities since the Gilded Age are undergoing a
transformation. It will become important that, in addressing the financing of ex-
traordinary service obligations, regulators avoid building into competitive retail
markets structural mechanisms that harm consumers. As this article has sug-
gested, in the initial restructuring of the regulated utility markets, to the extent
regulators or courts extend the duty to serve beyond incumbent distributors, to
suppliers and marketers, new inefficiencies may result. Imposition of basic
service obligation on the DisCo, to be fulfilled through voluntary procurement of
power supply and financed through a system benefits charge, minimizes the inef-
ficiency of imposing a service obligation in a competitive market.
Despite efforts to maintain the de jure monopoly status of power distribu-
tion, competition may prove inevitable in the long run even for this segment of
the electricity industry. Increasingly, the availability of distributed generation
threatens the need for power distribution as adequate substitutes may be avail-
able to customers who can afford generation. Due to the growth of distributed
generation, the power generation industry may be set for a future similar to the
current main frame computer industry, which has been seriously threatened by
the desk-top personal computer industry.7° Some have suggested that power
69. Eli M. Noam, Will Universal Service and Common Carriage Survive in the Telecommunications Act
of 1996?, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 955,958-63 (1997).
70. Matthew Carolan & Raymond J. Keating, Microturbines: The Engine of Deregulation, INVESTOR'S
BUS. DAILY, Dec. 15, 1997, at A40; Laurence Zuckerman, Tiny Turbine: The Next Generator?; Company
Hopes Its Small Unit Will Dominate Power Market, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 2, 1997, at D1.
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distribution may ultimately become a competitive or contestable industry.7 To
the extent these developments occur, the ability of a single DisCo to recover the
costs of its extraordinary service obligations through a system benefits charge for
a geographic area will be weakened significantly. In competitive distribution
markets, a more efficient way to finance service obligations may be through a
national sales tax on power distribution or supply coupled with federal voucher
and service extension grant programs to guarantee minimum service quality.72
Enhanced retail competition in historically regulated markets need not mean
the end of traditional doctrines of public utility law, such as the duty to serve.
Yet, regulators must be bold and creative in approaching the content and fi-
nancing of extraordinary service obligations for new actors in these markets,
while keeping a keen eye on minimizing the structural inefficiencies such obli-
gations pose. Careful study and appreciation of the distinct economic and insti-
tutional structures of various utility service markets will be necessary to provide
sound guidance for regulators as they apply the duty to serve to competitive re-
tail industries. At each step of this analysis regulators must not only ask whether
there are efficiencies to be gained. Clearly there are, but the challenge regulators
face is to devise ways of passing these new efficiencies on to the average con-
sumer.
71. Thirty years ago, Harold Demsetz observed that the history of utilities has been characterized by
competition for service areas. Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities? II J. LAW & ECON. 55, 59 (1968)
("There is scarcely a city in the country that has not experienced competition in one or more of the utility in-
dustries.") (quoting BURTON N. BEHLING, COMPETITION AND MONOPOLY IN PUBLIC UTILITY INDUSTRIES 19-
20 (1938)). Of course, the availability of distributed generation may make power distribution competitive in
the sense that for some customers switching to self-generation may make distribution unnecessary, so distribu-
tion markets will begin to compete with the availability of affordable self-generation, as they already do for
some large industrial customers. In addition, some economists suggest that power distribution networks can
operate in a competitive manner if property rights are defined so as to facilitate the development of joint ven-
tures. See, e.g., Smith, supra note 55.
72. These alternatives are discussed further in Jim Rossi, The Common Lmv "Duty to Serve" and Pro-
tection of Consumers in an Age of Competitive Retail Public Utility Restructuring, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1233
(1998).
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